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The chapters of this book discussed how the strategic cultures of different countries display 
common characteristics rooted in a special geopolitical space that has been subjected to 
simultaneous changes over a longer time. Shared historical experiences provide a common 
ground for perceived outside threats similarly. Traditions and history play a central role in the 
formulation of strategic interests. The various and ever-changing interpretations of history can 
be detected through time and among the different subgroups formulating security 
conceptions, providing a fluctuation also within the realm of strategic culture. Even more 
importantly, the warehouse of history in any one nation is limited, hence, there is a limitation 
on interpretations, and in the end, on the options of strategic culture. History and cultural 
traditions produced also constraints on institutional change. Hence, for example, while NATO 
and EU memberships have anchored many countries of our region to Western institutions, 
nevertheless, they have not nullified underlining core policy preferences that could even run 
counter with Western institutional responsibilities.  
 
This is a puzzling aspect in regard to the first generation of strategic culture theorists who 
represented a determinist position, even if history was a key element in their analysis too. The 
second generation’s claims seem also somewhat contradictory in comparison to our findings. 
For the second generation there was no linkage between strategic culture and state behavior 
since behavior was dependent on the political elites’ interests and interest, not strategic 
culture, would define strategic choices. Subsequently, the elites everywhere have similar 
militaristic and realpolitik views, and they try to stay in power by using same kind of strategic 
discourses, where ‘us’ are threatened by external ‘them’.1 The chapters in this volume show, 
however, that even if in many cases the political elite backs their interests with historical 
cases suited to their interest, the strategic culture of that particular country offers a limited  
frame for what those interests can be and, therefore, goes often against the expected logic of 
interest-based behavior. The third generation of strategic culture brings into the debate the 
role of organizational culture stating that there is a connection between thought and action, 
and discourse has behavioral consequences. Johnston defined strategic culture as “an 
integrated system of symbols which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting grand 
strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in 
interstate political affairs”2. This means that strategic culture can be created by the political 
elite through narrative injection. The chapters in this book support this statement to a certain 
extent, nevertheless, they also argue that not any narrative is possible. Changes in the strategic 
culture are indeed embedded into the historical memory and geographical location of the 
country. 
 
Alan Bloomfield’s suggestion that strategic culture contained multiple co-existing strategic 
sub-cultures representing a different interpretation of a state’s international context gets 
confirmation from the chapters in this volume. However, Bloomfield does not explain how 
these groups have been formed. The chapters here provide an explanation in this matter and 
accentuate particularly two specific factors: the sense of in-between-ness and the role of 
neighbors, here, being situated in the Russian neighborhood. These are crucial factors if we 
want to understand better countries’ strategic behavior and what are realistic expectations of 
the effects of integration and socialization. 
 
 
Maneuvering in the In-Between Space 
 
The case studies of this volume offer a new insight into the significance of the in-between 
space which generates regional identities. This in-between-ness expresses itself differently in 
different cases but is a strong driver in building strategic culture. In-between-ness is an old 
concept, as we pinpointed in the introduction of this volume. Ever since sir Harold 
Mackinder, the notion helped to assess bipolar geopolitical power-relations and was analyzed 
from the perspective of the idea of the buffer-zone and/or the sphere of influence. The buffer 
zone indicates also a competitive situation where the juxtapositioned powers challenge each 
other for the control of the territory. The in-between space marked by a bipolar constellation 
creates a limited horizon, per se. In addition, the countries in this sphere are unable to change 
their in-between situation. In academic literature this subject position has been investigated 
from various sets of interlinked theories related to small states3, the center-periphery 
construct4 and the shelter theory.5 
 
We made three observations based on the chapters of this book: 1) the in-between position 
complicates and brings an element of unpredictability into strategic behavior of the countries; 
2) in-between-ness is a valuable strategic position that opens up a great variety of 
possibilities; and 3) and these countries develop resembling strategies and regional identities. 
 
According to our first observation, the in-between position complicates and brings an 
element of unpredictability into policy making. Since the in-between existence displays a 
shifting between two poles of gravity, the different subgroups can understand and translate 
this fluctuation divergently. They may display different priorities regarding which pole should 
be favored in the formulation of strategic goals. Hence, the question is which party is able to 
secure dominant political positions. Many of the countries in this volume have “surprised” 
outside observers due to the way their political culture has fluxed since the fall of the Soviet 
Union. Ukraine, Hungary, Moldova and Bulgaria can be mentioned as prime examples here. 
 
Our second observation is that in-between-ness is a valuable strategic position that opens up 
a great variety of possibilities. In-between-ness can be seen simultaneously as a security 
hazard and a strategic potential. The knowledge of being situated in a buffer zone or sphere of 
influence has undoubtedly a strong impact on security conceptions, language and culture of 
the countries in-between. The concepts of buffer zone and spheres of influence strongly 
indicate outsiders’ views towards small and medium size countries in great power politics. In 
contrast, the in-between position is something that the countries construct themselves. In-
between-ness produces a consciousness of double options the juxta-positioned poles’ 
competition offers. When competing to gain influence over a territory the competitors have to 
present benefits for the countries to be willing to group up with them. The poles’ competition 
does not require or push the countries necessarily to choose between them but opens up a 
possibility to skillfully play with two sets of cards. This type of strategic behavior comes up 
in many of this book’s articles. Some of the best examples are perhaps the way how Belarus, 
Moldova or Hungary are acting or how Turkey’s political elite has used the possibility to 
choose a dominant sub-culture. There are also dangers in this “game” as the Ukrainian 
example has shown. 
 
The third observation is that since the in-between position concerns several national entities 
situated in the same geography – these countries develop resembling strategies and in some 
cases regional identities when coming to terms with the limitations, threats and advantages of 
their geographical space. This shared experience of navigating between this double 
orientation – for a relatively long time, in some cases even over centuries – can be detected in 
the common features in the individual countries’ strategic culture. In other words, there are 
inevitably elements that are regionally coded. Regionality, furthermore, does not influence 
only the countries’ foreign policy agenda and alliances but it also affects decisions regarding 
domestic matters and even profound societal choices. Common action based on regional 
identification can improve the individual countries’ negotiating position. The examples in this 
book show this in rather interesting ways. Nordic countries are all very different and have 
different security solutions, but they maneuver inside of the Nordic-ness and can even create 
policies independently, although not in contradiction to alliances like NATO or membership 
like the EU. Similarities are found also in the cases of Baltic states and Visegrad-states. 
Regional alliances were seen as important to maintain even if the countries were members of 
wider communities of the NATO and the EU. The regional context provides the individual 
countries wider elbowroom than the international organizations. Also, outside the 
organizational umbrellas, regionality gives a framework which strengthens sovereignty, like 
in the case of Serbia.  
 
Regionality, on the other hand, can also be activated in times of security breaches in the 
immediate environment, as for instance is the case in the Black Sea countries. The Black Sea 
is a special geopolitical cross-road of multiple embedded great power interests. There are 
more dimensions interacting here than only East vs. West, which is why the countries 
concentrate, generally, on the wider strategic possibilities this area offers. In-between-ness 
becomes relevant only in crisis situations of great powers clashes when there is an urge to 
choose one’s side. 
 
Regionality does not only provide a context but also conditions development. Regionality 
creates a mediating level where the international arena and the national sphere interact. It 
offers an extra leverage and greater variety of possibilities for the countries to maneuver their 
national interests.  
 
 
In the neighborhood of Russia 
 
The factor of neighborhood clearly plays an important part in the formation of different sub-
cultures’ strategies. The in-between-ness and the regional aspect can be investigated from the 
perspective of one of the poles which creates a special angle to the neighborhood. The most 
important question in this regard is what kind of identity the countries in the in-between 
sphere have. In the case of Russia, the countries in Russia’s neighborhood have not always 
been fully independent, sovereign countries. This is due partly to Russia being a great power, 
and partly to how Russia has defined its role in international politics, what its security 
concerns and economic interests are. Part of Russia being a great-power has involved, as 
Jeremy Smith wrote in his chapter, a feeling of responsibility for its neighborhood. This 
Russian sense of duty has been interpreted differently in different countries shaping their 
strategic culture. Often when Russia’s responsibility has activated, it has raised security 
concerns in its neighborhood, as for example in the case of the Ukraine crisis. As Jeremy 
Smith observed, “The idea of such a responsibility can be traced back to the doctrine of 
‘Moscow as the Third Rome’ and subsequent messianism arising in the fifteenth century”. 
This means that for centuries Russia’s interpretation of its role in the neighborhood has also 
inevitably penetrated into the strategic culture of its neighbors. Accordingly, when analyzing 
strategic culture we have to take into consideration not only the individual country’s threat 
perceptions and historical continuities of understanding the enemy but also how its neighbors 
see themselves. 
 
From the perspective of long-durée history, the countries in Russia’s neighborhood have 
developed survival strategies to come to terms the best they can with the Russian influence 
that has threatened their independent existence for centuries. Part of the survival strategies 
have been balancing between threat and opportunity. Even acute threats from Russia did not 
exclude the simultaneously existing advantages Russia can offer, as for instance in the cases 
of Hungary, Moldova and Belarus presented in this book.  
 
It is also clear that the balance between different sub-cultures as well as significant changes in 
a country’s strategic culture can come from shocks that are caused by outside actors. This is 
particularly clear when it comes to the Russian neighborhood. Russian actions and 
developments have strong effects on its neighbors. The Georgian war in 2008, the annexation 
of Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine in 2014 changed Lithuanian and Latvian policies. 
Similarly, the fall of the Soviet Union had a dramatic impact on the Nordic countries’ policy 
formulation. Furthermore, today Ukraine and Russia are further apart than ever and it remains 
to be seen if Ukraine’s historical position between East and West, Russia and the rest of 
Europe, will be balanced or will the crisis permanently alter Ukrainian strategic culture, away 
from Russia. This would confirm Bloomfield’s argument and also our first observation 
mentioned above, that as a result of various shocks, one or another sub-culture might surface 
and prevail in the discourse, thus leading to shifts in the dominant view on national security 
and military power. 6  
 
 
In Conclusion  
 
Strategic culture is closely interlinked with the idea of national interests in a spatial context 
that is defined by potential threats, perceptions of friends and foes, traditions of alliances, and 
institutional linkages. The contributions of the different cases showed that the in-between 
space as a regional option becomes valuable in times of international shocks, modest 
challenges or when the countries experience pressure from the center they are institutionally 
attached to. In times of immediate security breach, however, the regional dimension does not 
offer a shelter, therefore, the countries strengthen their relations to the security provider 
center.  
 
The role of a powerful neighbor, in this case Russia, is also very significant when it comes to 
the interplay between the different sub-cultures. In the countries that rely on strong historical 
and symbolic bonds of Slavic brotherhood – Belarus, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Serbia – the 
power elites exploited the in-between position and Russia in their domestic battles for power. 
Furthermore, the threat of Russia has also been played out in the international context, in 
order to secure a more beneficial position within international organizations, as in the Polish 
case, thus, blurring sometimes the line between real threat, potential threat and no threat at all.   
 
The chapters in this book have shown that the analysis of strategic culture focusing solely on 
the position of leadership, have missed an important element: namely the geographical 
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